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ABSTRACT 
We extend the scope of creativity from the traditional realm of the human mind—a 
goal-seeking (teleological) system—to all end-directed (teleonomic) systems. Using 
the simple metaphor of an agent exploiting local hills and exploring global hills on a 
fitness landscape, we describe commonalities between (pseudo-)serendipity, humor, 
mistakes, (bordering) madness and analogy making—phenomena often associated 
with creativity. We suggest that they are observed characteristics of a single process 
that we call teleonomic creativity. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Creativity seems to have three attributes, exploration (as opposed to exploitation), 
novelty and usefulness. In terms of an adaptive fitness landscape (Wright, 1932), 
exploitation can be interpreted as a search of the local hill, and exploration constitutes 
a metaphorical jump to a global hill that is separated from the local hill by a valley.  
 
We describe the interactions of a certain group of end-attaining processes, namely 
teleonomic processes, with the fitness landscape environment in an attempt to show 
how these can be interpreted as exemplars of creativity. We divide them into two 
classes, a) those involving local interactions and b) those involving global 
interactions. We term the class of successful global interactions between teleonomic 
systems and their environment teleonomic creativity, where success describes the 
action that elevates the system’s fitness to fulfil its teleonomic nature. In the particular 
case of teleological systems, we meet with examples of creativity that have become 
known as  (pseudo-)serendipity, humor, mistakes, (bordering) madness and analogy 
making. Using our model we compare the similarities of those phenomena and 
describe how these can be understood as labels for observed characteristics of a 
teleonomic system attempting to raise its fitness. 
 
DEFINITIONS 
We apply our interpretation of creativity to a particular set of systems acting within a 
search space. It is therefore appropriate to start with a definition of this set and the 
search space. Creativity as we understand it, can be encountered as part of any 
teleonomic process interacting with a metaphorical fitness landscape. Both terms will 
be defined in the following. 
 
Teleomatic, Teleonomic and Teleological 
Creativity as we understand it can be encountered as part of any end-directed process. 
End-directed processes are a category of end-attaining processes. End-attaining 
processes are divided into three categories, each of which has been assigned a discrete 
label and containing the next lower category, i.e. the concepts relate to each other in 
an inclusive manner. The way by which an end-state is reached by a particular process 
determines the term used to describe the process with. These delineations of end-
attaining activity are called: teleomatic processes (end-resulting), teleonomic 
processes (end-directed) and teleological processes (goal-seeking). Teleomatic 
processes are all those processes of physical systems in which a definite end-result is 
reached strictly as a consequence of physical laws and as the result of the existence of 
matter and energy, as in gravity, entropic decay or reaction gradients. End-states are 
reached without any purpose or control. An example is a falling rock which reaches 
its endpoint on the ground due to gravitational laws (Mayr, 1974, 1982; O'Grady & 
Brooks, 1988). Teleonomic processes owe their end-directed behaviour to the 
operation of an internal program. No intelligence (internal or external) needs to be 
attributed to the process in order to explain its behaviour. The apparent 
purposefulness displayed is derived from internal controlling factors that determine 
the end-states of biological processes as in homeostasis, ontogeny and reproduction. 
The definition of teleonomic as programmed behaviour extends to man-made 
machines (Mayr, 1974, p.114). Teleonomic systems are capable of goal-seeking 
behaviour but the goals must be fed into the system from the outside (Coulter & 
Johnson, 1982, p.43). Teleological processes are goal-seeking and owe their 
directedness to internal cognitive mechanisms. This purposeful behaviour reliant on 
cognitive mechanisms is most predominant in humans but exists to various degrees in 
other animals (Mayr, 1974) and the immune system (Castro & Timmis, 2002, p. 197; 
Cohen, 2000).  
 
Dynamic Fitness Landscape 
The actions of a teleonomic process are characterised by its environment. A static 
environment is a rare situation in nature due to constant interaction of systems with 
each other. It would also not require any adaptation since once an optimum had been 
found it would persist. We must therefore concentrate our investigations on dynamic 
environments which foster the occurrences of adaptive processes. The metaphor of an 
adaptive fitness landscape was introduced by Sewall Wright (1932) in the context of 
evolutionary biology. Depending on the discipline using this same concept we find 
alternative terms such as Klondike space (Boden, 1994, p. 121), error surface and 
energy landscape. 
 
According to Wright, the individual characteristics or traits of an organism can be 
viewed as the manifestation of a point in a multi-dimensional coordinate system. Each 
axis of this system corresponds to a particular trait influencing the fitness, or chance 
for survival, of the carrier. Organisms that share environments can influence one 
another, most dramatically in the case of predator-prey interactions. The fitness 
landscape of an individual organism thereby undergoes dynamic changes caused by 
adaptations of other members of the shared environment. The aim of any occupant of 
this landscape is to reach the highest point since height is equated with fitness; fitness 
for survival in the strict Darwinian sense and fitness of concepts for a purpose in the 
mental world. In the latter case we find it convenient to use the term concept 
landscape to describe a fitness landscape in which the biological traits are replaced 
with concepts in mental space. 
 
The combination of Donald Campbell’s (1960) ideas of blind variation and selective 
retention in creative thought, with those by Wright leads us to a useful application in 
human creativity—an adaptive concept landscape formed by mental concepts. This 
analogy has in fact been suggested by Murray Gell-Mann (1994, p. 266), the Nobel 
laureate who gave the quark (a subatomic particle) its name, in his book The Quark 
and the Jaguar. 
 
It is important to realise that the metaphorical n-dimensional fitness landscape 
contains all permutations of configurations that are possible to implement with the 
available members of an ensemble at a certain moment in time. It is not a model of the 
physical space surrounding us. Any kind of search is just a means of discovering a 
particular configuration that raises the searcher’s fitness. Only the actual 
implementation of a configuration, i.e. the metaphorical jump to another hill, alters 
the fitness landscape and introduces dynamics. This covers what we call innovation in 
everyday language, the implementation (or creation) of a device, process or 
something in the mind. Such a jump can be modeled in a brain or simulated in a 
computer program to enable the modeler to predict changes in subsequent time steps1. 
 
Various methods can now be used to change the position on a landscape in order to 
move to a higher point. Pudmenzky (2004b) introduced teleonomic entropy, a novel 
measurement based on the phase-space of teleonomic systems that allows us to 
distinguish between systems that are in a random state or in a state of active search. 
We will not concern ourselves here with the mechanisms of change; we will rather 
investigate the type of changes that can be encountered and their implications. 
 
THE CREATIVE TELEONOMIC PROCESS 
This article is concerned with the application of creativity to teleonomic processes and 
all other processes contained therein. We will refer to it as teleonomic creativity from 
here on. The above definitions served us to define the scope for our investigations that 
remove us from the conventional use of (teleological) creativity, i.e. in the domain of 
thinking or the arts encountered only in context with mankind, but we do so only to 
immediately embrace them again in this much broader context of teleonomic 
creativity. 
                                                 
1 Jumping to a hill in a mental fitness landscape also alters the “real” fitness landscape. This is not 
contradictory since this jump is contained in the initial conditions being one possible configuration of 
the ensemble. 
 Creativity is observed on many levels of complexity in many dissipative systems. 
These systems are in turn discussed in many disciplines under varying names—
interacting chemical molecules in chemistry and the human mind in psychology, for 
example. Due to this dispersion, an (over)specialised understanding of a diluted 
version of creativity has been developed within each discipline. Therefore, only 
certain processes, each one familiar to the discipline in question, have been taken into 
consideration. Hence a clear mechanism of operation for creativity, or even a concise 
definition of it, has so far eluded us. Creativity is displayed by organic molecules 
when assembling themselves for the first time into complex structures like DNA 
which is able to code for the production of other complex organic molecules, under 
certain epigenetic conditions, to the extent that one may be tempted to view it as an 
“act of creation” that was deemed to be impossible without the involvement of a 
higher intelligence. Discoveries made by great scientists in turn have also been named 
creative acts. Many artists are said to have produced creative works of art. Some of 
these discoveries and works however were produced by serendipity, under the 
influence of drugs or by mentally ill people. 
 
The interpretation of creativity started to diverge and to mean different things to 
different authorities. Intelligence was thought to be a prerequisite for creativity and 
therefore only believed to be exhibited by higher life forms such as ourselves. But 
who should get the credit when something is created without goal-directed input? To 
avoid a chicken-and-egg stalemate, creation, and therefore creativity, must have 
started somewhere without intelligence. It is this broader concept of creativity that we 
are investigating here and applying a name to. 
 In the past the subject of creativity has been addressed from a teleological perspective. 
Attempts to define creativity and the events leading to it have been made in many 
disciplines, but the common origins, mechanisms and conditions for its emergence are 
still unclear. Creativity is commonly understood as the ability to create something 
novel and useful. But how, for example, can the creation of life from chemical 
molecules be understood using the same concept as that referring to human creativity? 
In the past, purpose was presumed to exist in teleonomic or even in teleomatic 
processes where there was just end-directed or end-resulting behaviour to be found. 
Biologists resolved the issue by introducing clarifying terminology. We are using 
identical terminology to widen the sense of creativity with a relationship 
encompassing all teleonomic processes. 
 
For the purpose of better understanding the original meaning of creativity, we have 
utilised the term teleonomic creativity. We distinguished teleomatic processes from 
teleonomic processes and reasoned that creativity is an observable characteristic of 
any teleonomic process which includes teleologic processes by definition. In the next 
section we will describe the interactions between a teleonomic process and its search 
space. 
 
PHENOMENA SURROUNDING HUMAN CREATIVITY  
Many words have been directly or indirectly linked with creativity. Mad scientists and 
serendipitous discoveries caused by mistakes are probably the most commonly 
encountered clichés for creative forces. Humor and analogy are also thought to be 
related to creativity since they contain an element of surprise and novelty. However, 
when we are asked to define exactly how creativity is linked to those concepts, we 
may experience difficulty expressing this relationship in simple terms. 
 
In the following sections we will suggest how the association of each of those 
phenomena with creativity can be interpreted using our model, but we do not claim to 
have given a comprehensive account of those phenomena. The overview shown in 
FIGURE 1 gives a graphical summary of the words commonly brought into 
connection with human creativity and our interpretation of this affinity, using the 
metaphor of a search on a fitness landscape. 
 
FIGURE 1. Phenomena surrounding human creativity. Shown is a one-dimensional fitness 
landscape as a simplified metaphor for mental concept space. Creativity leads to discovery of peak 
A, realisation of a novel solution to a problem. The same path is taken in pseudo-serendipity, 
accidental realisation of a solution thought for. Serendipity leads to discovery of peak B, 
accidental realisation of a solution to a problem that a solution was not thought for. Humor takes 
us on an identical path, the story of a joke makes us believe we will discover a solution in a given 
context A, only to discover a new interpretation B. Mistakes are ventures with reduced fitness of 
concepts for a purpose, caused by incomplete evaluation of consequences, subconscious mental 
processes or un-anticipated dynamic response of the fitness landscape. Bordering madness is the 
persistent use of a large standard deviation in jump step size, solutions suggested seem bizarre 
and eccentric to others. Analogy making is the comparison between concepts far apart in concept 
space. To find a fitting analogy large areas of concept space have to be searched and evaluated. 
 
Mistakes 
Mistakes can be regarded as a necessary by-product of creative behaviour (mistakes 
leading to new discoveries will be discussed in the context of serendipity in the 
following section). By increasing the standard deviation for random thoughts we will 
often find inferior ideas located in the valleys of the mental concept landscape below 
our current altitude (cf. FIGURE 1). This must not necessarily be a disadvantage since 
we are concerned with mental manipulation of concepts. We have the mechanism for 
rejecting fruitless ideas even after they have been brought to the attention of 
conscious thoughts as Donald Campbell (1960) suggested. Like the auditory feedback 
for the blind person, they provide us with valuable feedback that can guide us to an 
optimum setting for the standard deviation of our blind subconscious thought 
processes, we learn from our mistakes as we say. But even an optimal setting will still 
produce mistakes since the standard deviation is only a parameter that influences the 
variation of the size of a random process around a mean value, not the size itself. 
 
According to Sigmund Freud, mistakes can also be expressions of our subconscious 
thoughts. In 1901 Freud (1917) dedicated a whole volume called Zur 
Psychopathologie des Alltagslebens (The Psychopathology of Everyday Life) to the 
analysis of various forms of mistakes. Freud considered forgetting to be a mistake and 
in what is considered the author’s most popular work, the forgetting of proper names, 
forgetting of foreign words, forgetting of names and order of words, mistakes in 
speech, mistakes in reading and writing, forgetting of impressions and resolutions, 
erroneously carried-out actions, chance actions and combined faulty acts can all be 
attributed to the actions of subconscious thought processes. We hypothesise that a 
subconscious process is revealing a thought that the conscious mind is not aware of. 
We will continue this line of investigation when discussing serendipity in the next 
section. 
 
Attempts to reduce mistakes to a minimum can be counter productive during an 
exchange of ideas. As in the privacy of our minds, making mistakes during the 
development phase of something new is a normal part of progress. Suppressing 
mistakes will only result in either zero-output or small steps and associated small 
improvements. A creativity-promoting atmosphere requires the suspension of 
judgement so that participants will not feel intimidated by constant criticism and 
continue to contribute their views into the discussion, as required during 
brainstorming. When mistakes are used as stepping stones instead of being totally 
discarded, they may lead to new discoveries. This aspect will be discussed in the next 
section. Using our model we interpret mistakes as fitness lowering actions . 
 
Serendipity 
Calling something a mistake is an a posteriori judgement. To qualify an action as a 
mistake, we evaluate its consequences under certain criteria and find that the action 
has not produced a favourable result. A new perspective however, produced by a 
change in criteria, may view the same situation differently. Mistakes can thereby not 
only be considered an undesirable side-product of creativity as outlined in the 
previous section, but more importantly, with a shift in perception, mistakes can lead to 
new discoveries as remarked by Umberto Eco (1998, p. 53) and exemplified for 
example by Gell-Mann (1994, p. 266) who describes how a mistake (a slip of the 
tongue) lead him to an important discovery in elementary particle theory in 1952. 
 
Amongst the many stories collected and documented by Roberts (1989, p. 7), one 
illustrates this well. A legend from the Andes tells the story of an Indian who got lost 
on the mountain, developed a high fever and drank from a stagnant pool of water. The 
water tasted bitter and he realised that this was caused by the surrounding quina-quina 
(cinchona) trees believed to be poisonous. He survived to tell the story to friends in 
his village. The fever was caused by malaria and the bark of the tree was from then on 
used as a cure. Jesuit missionaries in the early seventeenth century heard about this 
legend and the active antimalarial substance in chinchona bark, quinine, was isolated 
in 1820, the chemical formula was discovered in 1908, and the laboratory synthesis 
was accomplished in 1944.  
 
This phenomenon is called serendipity and the above example makes it clear how the 
mistake of getting lost and drinking bitter water lead to the discovery of a new 
medicine now produced synthetically. It illustrates beautifully how mistakes, 
serendipity and creativity are intertwined with each other. It also demonstrates how 
the exploration of the global concept space (initiated by the mistake of an individual, 
getting lost) and the following large conceptual jump (the connection between the tree 
and the fever) lead to the discovery of a new fitness peak (a medicine for malaria), 
and how this global search was refined by subsequent local search (exploitation) to 
isolate and manufacture the active ingredient.  
 
The best-known case of serendipitous discovery was probably Columbus’ discovery 
of America in the attempt of reaching the Indies by sailing westward in 1492. 
Incidentally, his discovery was also based on a mistake. He believed he only had to 
sail a short distance west to reach Asia since the then known world map, furnished by 
Ptolemy, extended 180 degrees to the east and west. In reality the Eurasian land mass 
only covers 105 degrees of longitude, consequentially, the elongation greatly 
shortened the unknown portion of the earth. Ptolemy had mistakenly exaggerated the 
width of the Eurasian land mass. 
 
Serendipity in scientific discovery has been the subject of many discussions, see for 
example (Bohm & Peat, 1987) or (Roberts, 1989). Serendipity is understood to be the 
faculty of making accidental discoveries of something valuable not sought for 
(finding B when looking for A). It could also be termed “accidental sagacity” with 
sagacity being the ability to form an opinion by distinguishing and evaluating, or the 
intelligent application of knowledge acquired from years of learning and experience. 
The term pseudo-serendipity was suggested by Roberts (1989, p. x) for the accidental 
discovery of something thought for (finding A when looking for A). Recently de 
Chumaceiro (1995a) opposed the “undesirable, unscientific” prefix “pseudo” and 
suggested the use of “serendipity analogues” for pseudo-serendipity and “serendipity 
proper” for serendipity. Chumaceiro’s motivation comes from his desire to avoid 
“even more resistance than serendipity itself has triggered in academic and scientific 
circles”, but we will not make use of these terms here. The discovery of the 
vulcanisation of rubber by Goodyear for example, is pseudo-serendipity. Charles 
Goodyear had been obsessed with finding a way to put rubber to good use for years. 
One day he accidentally dropped a piece of rubber mixed with sulfur on a hot stove. 
Through this process, he discovered that it retained its elastic properties under 
temperature changes, which allowed it to be used for a variety of applications. 
Through subsequent experimentation (local search), he determined the exact 
conditions leading to an optimal process he called vulcanisation after Vulcan, the 
Roman god of fire. 
 
The history of the word is covered by Remer (1965) and described as follows. The 
term serendipity was coined by the English author Horace Walpole from the 
characters in the Persian fairy tale The Three Princes of Serendip, who made such 
discoveries (Remer & G, 1965, p. 6). It was not until Theodore G. Remer, a lawyer 
who collected numerous details on the subject, published Serendipity and the three 
Princes in 1965, that all information on the history of the word serendipity and its 
origin had been finally compiled into a single source (Remer & G, 1965). In one of 
his 3,000 or more letters, on which his literary reputation primarily rests, and 
specifically in a letter of 28 January 1754 to his friend Sir Horace Mann, Walpole 
says that “... this discovery, indeed, is almost of that kind which I call Serendipity, a 
very expressive word.” Walpole formed the word on an ancient name for Ceylon 
(now known as Sri Lanka), Serendip (from Persian Sarandp or from Arabic Sarandb). 
He explained that this name was part of the title of “... a silly fairy tale, called The 
Three Princes of Serendip: as their highnesses traveled, they were always making 
discoveries, by accidents and sagacity, of things which they were not in quest of ... for 
you must observe that no discovery of a thing you are looking for, comes under this 
description.” 
 
The Encyclopedia of Creativity therefore stresses that serendipity is characterised by 
unintentionality and that phrases such as automated serendipity or planned serendipity 
are misuses of the word (M. A. Runco & Pritzker, 1999, pp. 543-549). 
 
Mistakes can be the cause of serendipitous discoveries as we foreshadowed in the 
previous section. Mistakes can either be caused by external accidents, or internal 
(human) factors. If caused by internal factors they can be analysed psychoanalytically. 
This has not only been proposed by Freud (1917), but has also been reinforced more 
recently by Albert Rothenberg (1988) who generalised that “any error effect 
consisting of a discrepancy between intent and execution results from the operation of 
unconscious factors”. However, one also makes errors during conscious evaluation of 
events since associational connections formed in the cerebral cortex are not precise. 
Rothenberg (1988) objects to the use of the word serendipity in the literature and 
proposes the phrase “articulation of error” and “conversion of error”. In accidental 
discoveries such as the discovery of Penicillin by Fleming, the X-ray effect by 
Roentgen and immunology by Pasteur, scientists further developed an “error” that had 
happened with full understanding of the circumstances. Subsequent clarification 
would then isolate this error. In Rothenberg’s opinion the word error, rather than 
chance, better represents the discrepancy between the intent and the execution of the 
scientist. Chumaceiro (1995b) points out that Rothenberg’s statement applies to 
serendipity and pseudo-serendipity. 
 
Whether or not dreams lead to serendipity is debatable, but they have often been 
included in this category. Regardless, they are a good example of a fertile state of 
mind conducive to large jumps in concept space. It seems obvious that a prepared 
mind is needed to connect the dreaming subconscious to a conscious search for a 
solution. 
 
Using our framework of fitness hills in a concept landscape, serendipity becomes the 
accidental discovery of a global peak that increases our fitness in a way not 
anticipated before. 
 
Humor 
Verbal humor is caused by the introduction of a surprise element initiated by leading 
the listener down the garden path during a lead-up story (the stem) only to come to a 
dead-end where the only escape possible is via a large jump over the hedge to an 
alternative interpretation. This is demonstrated quite nicely by the following joke: 
Two goldfish in a tank, one turns to the other and says: “Do you know how to drive 
this thing?” The word fish is associated with the most likely interpretation of tank, 
namely fish-tank. In the context of fish the alternative interpretation of tank, namely 
armoured-tank just doesn't make sense and is completely ignored. It is not until the 
reader meets with the word drive that the second meaning of tank is re-discovered via 
a large conceptual jump. The fact that fish and fish-tank do not produce any sense 
with drive triggers a new search of the surrounding concept landscape for something 
that connects with fish or tank to produce a meaning with drive. When armoured-tank 
is discovered we laugh. 
 
Humor, as a consequence of the discrepancy between two mental representations, 
results from the degree of divergence from an expectation, but the degree of 
individual differences in tolerance for ambiguity may determine when incongruity is 
perceived as funny, when it is found confusing, and when it is understood as serious 
(Staley & Derks, 1995, p.101). A particular subject (“Morris Braverman”) from 
Stanley Milgram’s (1974, p.52-54) famous experiment Obedience to Authority, in 
which subjects had to administer (fake) electric shocks to a victim under the 
instructions of an experimenter, reportedly broke out into laughter. This laughter 
seemed to be triggered by the (pretended) screams of the victim. When Mr 
Braverman, a thirty-nine-year-old social worker, was debriefed later, he reported that 
his laughter was “... a sheer reaction to a totally impossible situation ... of having to 
hurt somebody. And being totally helpless and caught up in a set of circumstances 
where I just couldn’t deviate ... this is what got me.” This laughter could be 
interpreted as a by-product of the desperate subconscious exploratory search for 
distant mental concepts in an attempt to find a way out of an unsatisfactory situation 
(Gibbs, 2001, p.18). Instead of laughing due to the discovery of disparate but related 
concepts, the laughter here could be the indicator of the reverse process, an attempt to 
discover disparate concepts related to a problem situation that could aid in resolving 
it. 
 
Sigmund Freud (1963, p.120) expressed the strength of a joke coming from its 
economy in psychical expenditure of transporting us from one circle of ideas 
(Vorstellungskreis) to another. The further these circles are away from each other 
before connection via a short-circuit, the higher the economy of the joke. A short 
excursion to the original work in the German language may make it easier for the 
reader to understand the translated version better. The original version (S. Freud, 
1975, p.97) contains the term Ersparung an Gedankenweg, the meaning of which 
translates to savings achieved in traveling a pathway of thought. Freud then used the 
term “Kurzscluß” as we will see in due course, which is translated to “short-circuit” 
but should rather be thought of as “shortcut” in this context. The following quotation 
from his work Jokes and their relation to the unconscious (S. Freud, 1963, p.120) is 
in strong support of the present interpretation of humor and its relation to creativity. 
 
If, therefore, we derive unmistakable enjoyment in jokes from being transported 
by the use of the same or a similar word from one circle of ideas to another, 
remote one ..., this enjoyment is no doubt correctly to be attributed to economy 
in psychical expenditure. The pleasure in a joke arising from a ‘short-circuit’ 
like this seems to be greater the more alien the two circles of ideas that are 
brought together by the same word—the further apart they are, and thus the 
greater the economy which the joke’s technical method provides in the train of 
thought. We may notice, too, that here jokes are making use of a method of 
linking things up which is rejected and studiously avoided by serious thought. 
 
The last sentence in this quotation points to the narrow-focus (or narrow-mindedness) 
of “serious thinking” that prevails in local search. Creative thinking in contrast, like 
humor, enjoys the wide space of remote concepts. 
 
A mathematical way of expressing Freud’s term “economy in psychical expenditure” 
may be found by the equation distance (of concepts to be connected) over time (taken 
to connect concepts) which happens to be the definition of velocity. The further away 
the concepts are and the less time it takes to connect them together (i.e. the speedier 
we arrive at the resolution), the better the joke. Intuitively, receiving “the punchline” 
is a similar feeling to the sudden “aha” experience of a newly conceived creative idea. 
The common skill necessary for both processes is connecting apparently unrelated 
concepts. 
 
Koestler (1969, pp.35,38) uses a model of two 2-dimensional planes intersecting at 
right angles symbolising different “frames of reference”, “associative contexts”, 
“types of logic”, “codes of behaviour”, “universes of discourse” or “matrices of 
thought”. In disciplined thinking only one matrix is active at any one time, humor is 
created when an idea is associated simultaneously with two habitually incompatible 
matrices (Koestler calls this “bisociation”), a point at the intersection of the two 
planes. 
 
Humor, in terms of movement on a concept landscape, can be expressed as an 
unexpected large jump to a global peak. 
 
Madness 
The ancient Greeks believed that different kinds of madness were produced by the 
gods. Plato claimed that a poet’s inspiration arose during “divine madness” but 
Aristotle wrote in the Metaphysics that the creative act was a natural talent. Almost 
any extraordinary performance or creative achievement was believed to come through 
a divine form of madness, each attributed to a different god. In the following we will 
use the term madness in this spirit, as a non-judgemental term to describe mental 
disorders or an altered mental state that is regarded special in some way by society. 
 
Of the many legends on how Archimedes died when Syracuse was taken by the 
Romans under Marcus Marcellus in 212 BC, the following, reported by Plutarch, may 
also account for the persistent analogy between the deep thinker and the mad or 
possessed person (Bragg, 1998, p.37). Archimedes was supposedly killed by a Roman 
soldier because he refused to move until he had resolved a problem he was working 
on. His eyes and thought were so intent upon a diagram and some calculations that he 
was completely unaware that the Romans had broken through the defences or that the 
city had been captured (Russell, 1998). The type of deep thinking required when 
solving a problem that requires a mental search of large areas of concept space 
occupies most of our brain’s capacity. Very little attention can be given to sensory 
information informing us of the state of the internal (e.g. hunger) or surrounding (e.g. 
noise) environment without running into the danger of “loosing one’s line of 
thought”. All attention is diverted to thought processes and any attempt to bring the 
thinker’s attention back to “the real world” is met with resistance. Anger is directed 
towards any such distraction, because the thinker knows that it takes much effort to 
get back to this state of mental evaluation of many variables if this is at all possible. 
Such a person is not conforming to our perception of “normal” social behaviour 
anymore and treated with suspicion. If a person is somehow predisposed to such a 
behaviour, maybe due to an imbalance of chemicals in the brain, this person is more 
likely to spend time in this state of mind. Under this view, mental illness could be 
seen to contribute to creative output. 
 
Salvador Dalí once said, “The only difference between me and a ‘madman’ is that I 
am not mad”. A person might only appear to be mad because his or her behaviour is 
not conforming to an arbitrary “norm”, without any evidence of a true clinical 
condition. Independence is thought to be a characteristic of a creative person; it can be 
expressed as autonomy, non-conformity, unconventionality or contrarian behaviour 
(M. Runco, 1999). Tony Buzan (1993, p.69), the inventor of mind mapping, makes 
the observation, “Abnormal or eccentric behaviour may be regarded as appropriate 
divergence from the norm, leading to increased creativity”.  
 
Recently Pettigrew (1998, p.2146) suggested a link between bipolar disorder (manic 
depression) and creativity. Pettigrew argues that both cerebral hemispheres’ 
dominance alternates from one to the other at a certain frequency that is characteristic 
of every person. Bipolar patients switch control at a slower rate; this would facilitate 
the exaggerated performance of one side in the dominant mode, thus causing the 
symptoms of the disorder. According to his hypothesis, the left hemisphere is 
responsible for planning and executing decisions while the right is highlighting any 
problems with those. Creativity is exhibited when the hemispheres are out of touch for 
a prolonged time and, after having developed greater differences, may show more 
diversity and potential for new ideas. 
 
These phenomena have been discussed in popular literature (Redfield, 1995) but the 
most comprehensive research was performed by Ludwig (1995). Ludwig compared 
over 1,000 creative people and their individual upbringing and illnesses. He found 
that the predisposition of many individuals to mental disorders is established long 
before their careers are launched. People who rebel against traditions, or find it hard 
to comply with formal rules because of their emotional makeup, get off to a running 
start in the world of creativity. He also remarks that certain emotional difficulties only 
become important if they are embedded in a matrix of other attributes and 
circumstances as well, where they can be either harmful or helpful. He summarises 
(Ludwig, 1995, p.11), 
 These findings ... suggest that a template for greatness exists that predisposes 
individuals to exceptional creative achievement. The key elements of this template 
include an innate ability to precociousness tempered by suitable education and 
training, the ‘right kind’ of parents and family resources, a certain irreverence 
towards authority, self sufficiency and independence, a sense of  physical 
vulnerability, the existence of psychological ‘unease’, works that bear a ‘personal 
seal’, and a striving for dominance or power. 
 
Individuals with a very large setting for their standard deviation of thought can appear 
to be mad (i.e. not conforming to the norm, outside the standard deviation from what 
is “normally” expected). This can be in terms of behaviour, appearance or social 
output. The possible cause could be either drugs or psychiatric conditions. These are 
normally caused by an inappropriate social context, which specifies a given 
behavioural output against a personal unspecific congenital predisposition. Only 
rarely is a genetic lesion the only cause, like in the case of porphyria for example. 
Here we will restrict our comments to the statement that the notions we developed in 
this article enable us to realise that the link between creativity and mental disorders 
can be found in a very high standard deviation of blind or sighted variation in 
thoughts caused by whatever means. 
 
Analogy 
In its original meaning from the Greek ana logon, “according to a ratio”, an analogy 
is a similarity of proportional relationships. In our context we restrict our 
investigation to functional analogies such as those made by Plato, “The idea of the 
Good makes knowledge possible in the intelligible world just as the Sun makes vision 
possible in the perceptual world”. Analogies form an integral part of language and are 
referred to as figures of speech in which an expression is used to refer to something 
that it does not literally denote in order to suggest a similarity.  
 
It requires creative effort to design a figure of speech. Let us investigate the simile 
“The game is as rough as the skin of an old man” to demonstrate this point. If we 
assume that we want to find a matching analogy for the beginning of the sentence 
“The game is as rough as...”, we have to find another context in which “roughness” is 
used. “Sandpaper” is a possible solution but it does not satisfy the novelty criterion 
since sandpaper is designed to be rough in the first place and a concept too close to be 
effective. Roughness of skin is contained in a different domain and therefore a more 
remote concept to roughness than sandpaper. Also, by comparing the agitated or 
violent behaviour of a game with the properties of a physical structure such as skin, 
the distance between domains is increased. We already introduced Freud’s idea of 
measuring the economy of a joke in terms of distance in section; the same measure 
may also be adopted for analogy. The line “The lion’s ferocious chrysanthemum 
head”, from the poem “The Monkey Puzzle” by Marianne Moore (1951, p.88), 
illustrates nicely the useful combination of elements drawn from domains which are 
far apart. Another example is the expression mere-hengest (“sea-steed”) as a metaphor 
for ship used in an Anglo-Saxon poem (Leech, 1974). Both, ships and horses, convey 
people in an up–and–down movement between places in warfare or an adventurous 
journey. In this way a writer uses metaphor to achieve a communicative effect beyond 
language. This conceptual fusion brought into existence by figures of speech, 
particularly evident in poetry, is an example of linguistic creativity. An analogy 
therefore is an expected association of remote but similar concepts (in the types of 
jokes we discussed earlier the association is unexpected since we can never be sure 
what part of the linguistic construct the analogy refers to until it is made). 
Corresponding with the remarks we made when comparing humor and creativity, it 
seems that the more remote the concepts are, the higher the quality of the analogy. 
 
The ability to make such remote connections has in fact been proposed as an indicator 
for creativity by Mednick (1962). He developed the “Remote Associates Test” 
(Mednick, 1967) which consists of sets of three words drawn from mutually remote 
associative clusters. The test candidate has to find this remote association as in “rat–
blue–cottage” (cheese), “wheel–electric–high” (chair). Since creative thinkers tend to 
have a very flat associative hierarchy, they can find these remote associations faster 
than others whose connection strength decays more rapidly with distance to related 
words. 
 
Analogies can also be used to aid creative problem solving. A well known example of 
utilising information from one domain to aid problem solving in another domain is the 
tumor problem described by Karl Duncker (Duncker, 1945) in 1945. Given a human 
being with an inoperable stomach tumor, and rays that can destroy organic tissue at 
sufficient intensity, by what procedure can one free the patient of the tumor by these 
rays and at the same time avoid destroying the healthy tissue that surrounds it? The 
time to solution to this problem—using several weak rays sent from various points 
outside the body that converge on the tumor site—is reduced if the subject is primed 
with an analog story of an army surrounding a fortress that is guarded by mined roads 
that do not explode when small bodies of men pass over them (Holyoak & Thagard, 
1996, p.110). 10 percent of subjects produced the convergence solution in the absence 
of a prior analogy, 75 percent succeeded when they first read the fortress story and 
where told to make use of it in solving the tumor problem. 
 
The discovery of analogies, i.e. creative expression, can be inhibited by functional 
fixedness (the tendency to use objects in their usual or customary ways) as 
demonstrated with the two string problem (Maier, 1931) and candle problem 
(Duncker, 1945). In the classic two-string problem subjects enter a room containing a 
chair, pliers, and other assorted objects and are asked to tie together two long strings 
hanging from the ceiling. The strings are too far apart for a subject to simply take hold 
of the end of each at the same time. The solution requires the subject to tie the pliers 
to one string and then to swing it to bring it within reach of the other string. The 
failure of most individuals to view the pliers as a potential pendulum weight 
represents functional fixedness. In the second example subjects are asked to fix a 
candle to a wall and light it. Materials available include matches, a candle and a 
matchbox filled with thumbtacks. The solution requires subjects to use the matchbox 
as a holder for the candle by fastening it to the wall with the thumbtacks. People are 
more likely to solve the problem if the matchbox is given empty, with the thumbtacks 
separately.  
 
We summarise that a good analogy is a valid connection of similar but far concepts in 
concept space. 
 
DISCUSSION 
We defined the necessary conditions for teleonomic creativity in terms of system 
characteristics. Of all end-attaining processes, only end-directed (teleonomic) 
processes can exhibit creativity. These include systems with a cognitive apparatus 
(teleological systems) such as humans, but also animals, complex molecules, 
machines and computer programs. Some examples of teleonomic creativity have been 
presented in (Pudmenzky, 2000, p. 216) and include genetic interactions, the 
behaviour of insects, birds and human hunters (fishermen). 
 
Using the model of a dynamic fitness landscape, where the term fitness describes the 
condition of a well-defined property being suitable for a purpose, we can now define 
teleonomic creativity as “The successful attempt of either individuals or populations 
to gain higher fitness via exploration of global fitness peaks as opposed to the 
exploitation of a currently occupied local peak”. Pudmenzky (2004a) showed 
mathematically that creativity can increase the chances of finding an appropriate 
solution. We can therefore view teleonomic creativity as part of an optimised search 
strategy that combines the local and global search efforts of teleonomic systems. 
 
We also recognise that creative behaviour is most successful when the environment is 
unstable. If a fitness landscape undergoes dynamic changes as in predator/pray 
adaptations, existing hills may disappear and new hills appear. Mutations (large jumps 
in gene-space) are a global search strategy that can provide advantageous adaptations. 
A successful adaptation caused by a mutation would be an example of teleonomic 
creativity. 
 
We can also transfer our results into population creativity since the model can be 
applied to any system of interacting agents regardless of level of abstraction, i.e. a 
system of interacting agents can play the part of a single agent in a larger system. An 
example for determining the optimum value of assistance in an agent society, 
modelled on the behaviour of ants, has been presented by Pudmenzky (2003). 
 
CONCLUSION 
In the previous sections we outlined why phenomena such as mistakes, (pseudo-) 
serendipity, humor, madness and analogy are often quoted in connection with 
creativity. Each one can in fact be linked to each other as we demonstrated in the 
previous sections and summarise in FIGURE 2. Using the knowledge gained from our 
model, we can now qualify what seemed to be an intuition only—we are observing 
different aspects of a single process. Each facet of the process, including creativity, 
has been given a different name in order to categorise and quantify its characteristics. 
These labels have been contrived for teleological processes in the first instance, but 
we do not see any problem in extending all these labels to the larger class of 
teleonomic processes. Each label classifies the movements of a teleonomic process on 
a (concept or fitness) landscape. 
 
We have shown how our model of teleonomic creativity can not only be used to 
explain other associated phenomena; it also suggests that those phenomena are just 
different aspects of a single process. We have previously expanded the definition of 
creativity to include teleonomic processes, the same terminology can therefore be 
utilised to refer to the phenomena observed in teleonomic processes where this 
categorisation provides us with an advantage. Since computer programs are 
teleonomic processes, we can further apply this terminology to the observed 
characteristics of artificial intelligence algorithms where appropriate. 
 
FIGURE 2. Summary of interconnections between phenomena often associated with creativity. 
All phenomena are labels for the observed characteristics of a single entity: A teleonomic process. 
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